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Conformance or evasion: Employment legislation and employment practices in selfcontained tourist resorts

Abstract
Using qualitative case study data from seven self-contained tourist resorts in the
Maldives, this study investigates how resort managers respond to employment
legislation (Law No.02/2008). Resort managers’ responses ranged from passive
compliance to active resistance, with decoupling through opportunism the dominant
strategy used to circumvent the legislation. Some HRM practices emerged from
resort managers’ interactions with external stakeholders and employees. Strategic
responses and HRM practices were driven by a search for legitimacy or efficiency
and sometimes both. The findings show that there are differences between strategic
responses and HRM practices by organisational subfield, local resorts and
international hotel chains. The resorts’ market orientation also influenced resort
managers’ responses and HRM practices.
Key words: Employment Law; Maldives; industrial relations; hospitality industry; resorts

Introduction
Studies of human resource management (HRM) and employment relations (ER) in
multinational corporations (MNCs) have primarily adopted a culturalist, and more recently,
an institutional perspective (Almond et al., 2005; Gunnigle et al., 2015; Vaiman and
Brewster, 2014). Most have focused on how elements of the institutional context such as
employment laws constrain organizational practices (Mayson and Barrett, 2017; van Gestel
and Nyberg, 2009). However the institutional environment is not always restrictive. HR
managers can create leeway in selecting HRM practices as a response to the institutional
environment (Barrett et al., 2014; Boon et al., 2009; Oliver, 1997). HR managers’ role in
interpreting the institutional environment and implementing HR strategies in response to
institutional forces has not received much attention (Watson, 2004) and requires further
theoretical development and empirical illustration (van Gestel and Nyberg, 2009).
Comparative institutional analysis has focused on the differences between first world
institutional archetypes and how these affect the making and remaking of formal rules
(Morgan and Hauptmeier, 2014) and, consequently, HRM practices. However, this stream
of research has largely examined mature economies (McPherson, 2008; Parry and Tyson,
2009; Vaiman and Brewster, 2014), ignoring differences between developed and
developing countries (Brewster and Mayrhofer, 2012; Budhwar and Debrah, 2009). There
is a dearth of literature on HRM in the context of small developing economies such as the
Maldives, despite these countries’ fluid institutional arrangements and the alternative
perspectives they offer for understanding how institutional organisational interactions
shape HRM practices (Gunnigle et al., 2015; Rupidra and McGraw, 2011).
Accordingly, this paper addresses the following research questions: (1) how does
employment legislation affect HRM practices in Maldivian resorts? (2) how do resort
managers respond to the legislation? (3) what motivates them to adopt specific responses,
and (4) how do strategic responses and HRM practices vary between resorts, e.g. between
international hotel chains and local resorts? This paper addresses these questions using

qualitative case study data from seven self-contained tourist resorts in the Maldives,
thereby shedding light on a context that so far lacks adequate academic investigation. Its
theoretical framework is institutional theory, which is well suited to analysing how
institutional forces such as employment legislation affect, and are affected by,
organisations (Burbach and Royle, 2014; Holm, 2014).
The paper is structured as follows. We first briefly review relevant literature on
institutional theory, strategic choice, sensemaking and HRM practices. We then discuss the
study’s research methods and present our findings. We conclude by discussing the
findings, their implications, limitations of the study and recommend future research
directions.

New institutionalism and HRM
Institutional theorists argue that organisational practices are shaped by the institutional
environment (Barley and Tolbert, 1997) and that organisations in the same field have
homogeneous structures and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The organisational
field is defined as “those organisations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognised area
of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies,
and other organisations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983, p.148). These authors contend that homogeneity in organisational structures and
practices results from three main isomorphic processes – coercive, mimetic and normative.
“Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble
other units that face the same set of institutional conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983,
p.149). Coercive isomorphism, a central focus in this paper, results from formal and
informal pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) which organisations perceive as force,
persuasion or invitation to collude (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and which cause them to
align their behaviour to fulfil their role as societal constituents (Meyer and Rowan, 1977)
or to gain legitimacy. Coercive mechanisms include influence from social partners (e.g.
trade unions and work councils), and government, including via employment law. As any
new law strengthening employee rights will affect HRM practices, organisations may need
to change their HRM policies and practices in response (Harcourt et al., 2010; Tsai, 2010;
Najeeb and Barrett, 2016). Consequently, HRM practices in organisations that belong to
the same organisational field become similar over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
The ideas in the preceding discussion have been criticised for their assumption that
organisations are passive recipients of readily available “scripts” provided by government
or other institutional carriers (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
argue that institutional environments are not “iron cages” but rather “may be expected to
exercise ‘strategic choice’ in relating to their institutional environments and responding to
institutional pressures” (Scott, 1991, p.70). More recent institutional research informed by
the strategic response perspective aims to understand how individuals function within
organisations, and investigates how institutional and industrial pressures shape individual
organisational actors’ choices (Burbach and Royle, 2014).

Strategic responses to institutional pressures
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Strategic choice, defined as “the process whereby power-holders within organisations
decide upon courses of strategic action” (Child, 1997, p.45), focuses on powerful
organisational actors, often top management. These actors’ choices are strategic because
they enable the organisation to relate to its environment, set standards of operating
performance against which economic constraints must be evaluated, and determine the
organisation’s structures. These choices are influenced by institutional pressures (Child,
1997).
Oliver (1991) argues that, to protect their interests, organisations choose from five broad
strategic responses to institutional pressures to conform: compliance, compromise,
avoidance, defiance and manipulation (a continuum from passive conformance to active
resistance). Compliance means full adherence to the pressures. Compromise emerges
where there are conflicting institutional demands and expectations. Avoidance includes
hiding non-conformity under a facade of ritual compliance. Defiance tends to occur when
the organisation’s internal interests “diverge dramatically from external values” (Oliver,
1991, p.157). Oliver (1991) also highlights possible determinants of an organisation’s
strategic choice, including the cause (why), constituents (who), content (what), control
(how), and context (where) that pressure organisations. Organisations select their response
according to the type of institutional pressure and the types of resources – financial,
reputational – that their constituents supply. Oliver’s (1991) typology of five strategic
responses embraces fifteen possible tactics (see Table 1).
INSERT Table 1 HERE
Some scholars argue that when faced with regulatory demands (e.g. requirements of
employment legislation), decoupling (see Table 1) is the most likely organisational
response (Edelman and Patterson, 1991). Decoupling, sometimes called organisational
hypocrisy (Krasner, 1991), is “a situation where compliance with external expectations is
merely symbolic rather than substantive, leaving the original relations or practices within
an organisation largely intact and unchanged” (Han and Koo, 2010, p.31).
According to Paauwe (2004), active agency determines organisations’ HRM choices.
Management is the most prominent decision-maker in organisations (Paauwe and Boselie,
2003). In Maldivian resorts, the resort management team (owners, general managers, HR
managers and line managers) are the prime HR actors (Najeeb, 2013), so they are the focus
of this study. HR actors and employees tend to have different values, goals and interests
(Gunningle et al., 2015) and may therefore differ in their strategic responses. Discrepancies
between institutionalised rules and situational demands for resources can encourage
agency. While strategic responses are often driven by competition, Boon et al. (2009,
p.504) argue that “active agency is the most important driver of the strategic responses to
institutional pressures”. This is reflected in Boon et al.’s. (2009) typology of organisations’
institutional fit: deviant, conformist or innovative. According to this typology, “an
innovative response reflects a choice for active innovative development in balancing
competitive and institutional pressures, a deviant response reflects active resistance, and a
conforming response reflects a neutral or reactive response” (Boon et al., 2009, p.496).
Gaps between institutionalised rules and situational demands for resources (tensions and
contradictions) can create room for actors to engage in innovative changes or institutional
entrepreneurship (Saher and Mayrhofer, 2014).
The strategic choice perspective helps explain variations within an organisational field
(Oliver, 1991) as human agency relates to the strategic choices organisations make to
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conform or differentiate themselves from competitors. Organisations do not necessarily
choose the most effective and efficient practices despite the promise of gaining competitive
advantage (Barrett et al., 2014). But achieving a balance between conformity (similarity)
and differentiation from their competitors (Boon et al., 2009; Mellahi, 2013) is imperative,
as becoming too similar or different could affect their competitive advantage (Barrett et al.,
2014).
Gooderham et al. (2006) argue that understanding the interpretative role of HR actors is
important to understanding organisations’ responses to institutional pressures. Actors can
read legislation and policies in different ways to legitimise their actions (Mayson and
Barrett, 2017). They can align organisation policies and practices to the legislation (van
Gestel and Nyberg, 2009) but, because the law can always be interpreted (Parry and Tyson,
2009), simple compliance is but one option among many. In international hotel chains
surrounded by inter and intra-organisational institutions and MNC networks, HR managers
may gain legitimacy by deriving their responses to changes in employment laws from these
institutions and networks (Gunnigle et al., 2015; Rupidara and McGraw, 2011). They can
also deflect, reinterpret or reform legislation by mobilising political, financial,
organisational, cultural and discursive sources. Managers can thus be considered
gatekeepers, interpreters and judges of the most appropriate HRM responses and practices
flowing from the institutional field.
Different interpretations of employment legislation can be based on different rationalities
or logics (van Gestel and Nyberg, 2009), including the instrumental-rational view, which
reflects a managerial, goal-driven perspective (efficiency), and a value-driven rationality
(legitimacy) which reflects moral and political ideals (Paauwe, 2004; Holm, 2014). Three
philosophies may shape organisational responses: basic compliance because it is the law,
moral justification, and business needs or utility. If they lack a good business reason or a
justification for high costs, managers may pay lip service rather than fully commit to the
law (Parry and Tyson, 2009). Most research finds the goals of efficiency and operational
effectiveness to be the main drivers in adopting specific responses (Adam-Smith et al.,
2003; Holm, 2014; Parry and Tyson, 2009).
The preceding discussion on the role of active agency assumes a rather instrumental and
rational form of agency, implying that actors are well informed of choices and that they
will accordingly make logical and strategic choices within institutional constraints.
However, one could ask: ‘how do actors become aware of these constraints?’ Therefore,
there is a need to explain the role of HR actors in relations to organisations’ strategic
choices in terms of how and under what conditions particular kinds of strategic response
emerge. This would also help answer the question of how and why organisations might
adopt particular institutional fits. Drawing on Weick et al., (2005), Mayson and Barrett
(2017) argue that the concept of sensemaking might explain not only what HR actors and
stakeholders do but also why and under what conditions they do it.
Sensemaking is defined as “the interplay of action and interpretation, where people seek to
understand and act on their experiences in complex environments and, in doing so they
enact the circumstances in which their actions are meaningful” (Mayson and Barrett, 2017,
p.194; Weick et al., 2005). As sensemaking is useful in explaining how actors construct
and reconstruct meanings in environments where ambiguous and imperfect information is
the norm, we will apply the concept of sensemaking along with strategic choice theory and
institutional theory to explain gain insight into how HR actors in tourist resorts respond to
employment law.
4

We now present the study’s research context, methods and empirical data.

The legislation: Employment Act (Law No.2/2008)
In May 2008, the Maldivian Parliament passed the Employment Act 2008, the first general
law governing employment relations and applicable to all employment sectors except the
security forces. It imposed severe penalties for violations of its provisions on forced labour,
unfair workplace discrimination, and the employment of minors. It also regulated various
individual employment matters, the employment of foreign workers, and employment
agency activities. Finally, it established an Employment Tribunal to adjudicate
employment disputes and authorized the Labour Relations Authority (LRA) to improve the
law’s application by identifying legal loopholes. However, except for the requirement to
create the LRA, a hybrid labour inspectorate and dispute resolution institution, the Act
does not cover industrial relations (IR) more broadly. Although the Act gives responsibility
for mediation and conciliation to the LRA and specifies the Employment Tribunal as a
mechanism for resolving employment disputes, it does not mention work stoppage or
strikes.
[INSERT Figure 1 HERE]
As presented in Figure 1, Najeeb (2014) identified design, content and implementation
challenges of the Maldivian employment legislation. These challenges give HR actors
freedom to respond to the legislation, providing a suitable context for investigating the
impact of the legislation on HRM practices in Maldivian resorts.

Research setting
The research was conducted in seven self-contained resorts in the Maldives. Located in the
Indian sub-continent, the Republic of Maldives consists of 1190 small coral islands of
which about 200 are inhabited. Tourism is the life-blood for the Maldivian economy. In
2013, tourism contributed 27% to GDP, 17.3% to government revenue, and 70% of the
country’s foreign currency earnings (Maldives Tourism Arts Culture [MTAC], 2018). The
resort sector is also one of the largest private sector employers, supporting 27,837 jobs or
14% of the country’s labour market in 2013 (World Trade Organisation [WTO], 2016).
Resorts provide 72% of tourism beds and primarily serve the high-end tourist market (see
Table 2). By the end of December 2017, the Maldives had received 1,389,542 international
tourists – three times its population (MTAC, 2018). European long-haul tourists accounted
for 47% of tourist arrivals in 2017 making them the leading market generator, but Asian
tourists were responsible for the highest growth (Zahir, 2016).
By the end of 2017, 135 resorts were in operation (MTAC, 2018). The resorts were selfcontained and developed under the country’s ‘one island, one resort policy’, based on the
‘enclave tourism’ philosophy. These resort islands are off-limits to the [indigenous] people
unless they are employed at the resort (Najeeb, 2013). Thus only employees and guests are
found in these resorts. In 2018, of the 135 resorts registered, 47% were operated by local
companies, 19% by foreign companies and 34% by joint venture (local and foreign)
companies (MTAC, 2018). As most resorts belong either to a local hotel group or an
5

international hotel chain, they operate as independent strategic business units, employing a
largely independent management team.
Despite the sector’s economic significance, there have been concerns over the lack of
engagement of the local workforce in resorts. Local employees make up less than 50% of
the resort workforce, and local women less than 3%. Notably, 51% of managerial and
supervisory positions are held by expatriates (Najeeb, 2014). Average salary levels of local
and foreign employees differ significantly. Attraction and retention of local employees has
become a daunting challenge for resort owners. The attrition rate of local employees
remains as high as 30% for most local resorts (Najeeb, 2013). When the Employment Act
(Law No.2/2008) was first enacted in the Maldives, resort workers were excluded from
Chapter 4 of the legislation i . Nevertheless, following pressure from resort workers, the
legislation was amended in 2008, providing workers with employment rights (Najeeb,
2014).

Research design, data collection and analysis
The research used a qualitative, interpretive and inductive research approach. An inductive
approach is appropriate for exploring “exotic cultures, understudied phenomena, or very
complex social phenomena” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.94). Institutional theory
favours interpretive methods which can capture how organisational actors experience
institutions, and the meanings actors apply to institutional practices (Holmes, 2014).
Seven resorts were selected: four locally owned and managed resorts and three belonging
to international hotel chains, representing 7% of resorts in operation. Studying several
resorts enabled us to capture detail and connect intra-organisational processes at the field
level. Organisations were selected to reflect maximum variation in the field in terms of
actors’ roles, and organisational size and ownership. As access to organisations was
granted on the condition of anonymity, pseudonyms are used to describe the resorts and
participants. Background information on the seven resorts is presented below (see Table 2).
Insert Table 2 HERE]
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews, informal interactions with
employees and managers (field observations), and contextual documents including
company web pages, reports, strategy and policy documents, employee handbooks, HR
best practice manuals, and posts in newspapers and blogs. This variety helped us uncover
the gap between officially announced and actually prevailing practices. A total of 57 semistructured interviews were held across all seven case organisations. Details of interviewees
are presented in Table 3. The interviews aimed to elicit views and opinions from multiple
perspectives. A range of stakeholders, employees and managers from different hierarchical
levels and job categories were interviewed in order to capture a comprehensive picture of
organisational and HR processes and strategic responses, and to corroborate views and
perceptions. Interviews covered a substantial number of non-managerial employees, whose
perspective is all too often absent from contemporary studies of work and employment.
[INSERT Table 3 HERE]
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Most interviews lasted between 30 and 75 minutes. Interviews were conducted English or
Dhivehi (the local language of the Maldivian people), according to the interviewee’s
preference. Respondents were asked questions such as ‘how would you describe the
compliance of resorts’ employment practices with laws and regulations?’ Interviews in
Dhivehi were transcribed verbatim and translated into English. Interview transcripts were
read several times, and coded according to key themes. Interview evidence was crosschecked and compared with other data sources, including documentary evidence. This
process of triangulation helped us understand actors’ strategic responses and the resulting
HRM practices, and also enabled us to develop each case independently and perform a
within-case analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Data from each case were coded and
patterns were identified before the patterns were generalised across the seven cases
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This allowed us to link cases to the strategic responses identified in the
literature.
Strategic responses and managerial actions
The themes that emerged from the analysis of interview data include various forms of
compliance, managerial interpretation of institutional pressure, negotiations with various
stakeholders, and achieving legitimacy by establishing and maintaining reputation. These
themes are presented below.

Responding to legislation through various forms of compliance
Managerial actions and strategic responses to the law demonstrated various forms of
compliance, ranging from proactive and strategic compliance to passive, partial and
ceremonial compliance.
When the law came into effect, some resorts took a proactive approach to conform
completely to the legislative changes that were rolled out:
As a group, we are adjusting all our contractual procedures to meet the
requirements of the Employment Act with the help of lawyers and by closely
working with our employee committees. (SNM20, Resort G)
In the early stages of implementation of the legislation, resorts hired lawyers and HR
professionals proficient in labour law to advise them on areas of the law which needed
interpretation and clarification. Some resorts (B, C and F) developed education and
communication programs to create awareness among employees about the legislation.
While in some resorts these programs were just one-off events, Resort C continued the
program by integrating it into the employee orientation program. Employees said the
program helped them clarify their rights.
Managers in Resorts A, B, F and G also said they were relaxed about the legislation and
had adjusted easily to it because their policies and procedures were already more or less in
line with the legal requirements, or because the interests of organisations and legislative
requirements coincided. The HR director of Resort A acknowledged that the resort found it
easy to comply with provisions in the Employment Act which were consistent with the
resort’s best practices:
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We are very happy to follow the due process as outlined by the law because it’s
in line with our best practices guidelines and our owners want to know the
reason if any employee is terminated (HRM39, Resort A).
This suggests that the legislation does not act always as a source of coercive pressure.
But others found it challenging to accommodate legislative changes. As a RM commented,
“We had a hard time to get adjusted to the labour law but finally, we did it” (SNM27,
Resort E). However, despite the managers’ stated commitment to complying with the
legislation, it would seem that only ‘lip service’ has been paid to implementing it. Even
managers who stated that they had no difficulty in complying with the law seem to have
adopted a ‘cherry picking approach’, complying with laws they see as attractive and
avoiding others.
Some resorts which initially made efforts to meet the requirements of the law appeared to
have reverted to practices that were in place before the law came into effect. As a nonmanagerial employee of a local resort noted:
Some things did change at the time the law came into effect. For example,
overtime allowance and pay for public holidays. But after some time things
returned to the way they used to be (NME05, Resort C).
This suggests that the law might have influenced organisational policies but did not
necessarily change organisational practices which were deeply rooted in the organisation’s
culture. The following comment from the general manager of the same resort reinforces
this view:
It will take time to accept the law in its spirit. Because it requires time to
orientate managers and employees and make them mentally ready to accept and
exercise provisions in the law. (SNM30, Resort C).
Although research suggests that employment legislation tends to become socially
embedded over time, the claims that both employees and employers would eventually
come to terms with the content of the law or that the compliance would eventually be
achieved seem to be yet another aspect of the rhetoric managers used to avoid compliance.
At the time of interviews, the law had been in place for almost five years, so a clear
narrative had had time to emerge.
The most common management response to the law appeared to be partial conformance in
order to minimally relieve the pressure for compliance. For example, it is very clear in the
law that Friday is a public holiday for Maldivians as Maldives is an Islamic country.
However, rather than treating Friday as a public holiday some resort managements
assigned employees reduced hours of work on Fridays. Managers justified this by saying
there was no difference between working on Fridays and other days because resort workers
were given days off according to a particular schedule.
Similarly, as the law requires resorts to grant paid annual leave to all employees, resorts
follow it. However, employees’ annual leave often became meaningless because they could
not take leave when they wanted to. For example, November and December fall during the
annual school holiday period, and civil servants usually opt to take leave then. However, as
this is also the high season in resorts, resort workers are unlikely to be granted leave during
this period. If an employee chose to go home for more than a week during this period, in
8

most cases he or she would have to resign. Moreover, some employees (for example, those
working in guest relations) opted not to take leave during this time even if they were
offered it because of the very high opportunity cost for them. As a Mr. Friday of a resort
belonging to an international hotel chain pointed out:
We can’t take leave during the season [November – February] or when the
resort has high occupancy even if I am asked to go on leave. I am working here
for tips, not for salary. If I take leave during the season I have to give up a huge
amount of my earnings (NME44, Resort A).
Partial conformance is also evident in how resorts deal with employment contracts.
Although resorts provided employees with written contracts, the contracts often did not
meet the requirements set out in the law. Management sometimes incorporated clauses that
favoured employer. As a non-managerial employee of a local resort reported:
We have a clause in the contract which says that under no circumstances can
we disclose our dealings with management to the media. (MNE02, Resort C)
Most employment contracts were also written in English using highly technical jargon,
making it difficult for some employees to understand the content of the agreement. As a
Tourism Employee Association of Maldives (TEAM) executive explained:
You need a degree to understand your contract. Employees have no choice but
to sign the contract as they won’t get the job otherwise. But they don’t
understand what they are signing (EAM15).
Whereas some resort managements used employment contracts to silence employees,
others used them to get rid of employees when they considered it necessary. As a line
manager of a local resort stated:
The Employment Act made our job easier in terms of dealing with employees.
We just need to put a clause in the contract about the conditions on which
employees can be terminated. If they go against it, we can terminate them
(LNM06, Resort C).
However, some managers and non-managerial employees believed that employment
agreements protected employees.

Interpreting pressures from a managerial perspective
Ambiguous provisions in the law and the changing nature of the legislation leave room for
different interpretations of the law. These ambiguities seem to be creating room for
innovative strategic responses based on creative interpretation and redeployment for new
purposes. HR actors in resorts appeared to be adopting a managerial perspective,
interpreting provisions of the law to their advantage, contrary to the spirit of the legislation.
For example, the provision on employee termination states that employment can be
terminated forthwith provided that salary and benefits for the required period have been
paid in lieu of notice (Article 25, Employment Act, 2008). Some managers interpreted this
provision as free rein to terminate employees they considered unfit for the job. This seems
to be the major reason that some resorts paid insufficient attention to selecting the best
candidates during the recruitment process.
9

However, the Employment Tribunal’s judgements on dismissal cases have increasingly
favoured employees. In unfair dismissal disputes the Tribunal often asks employers to
submit copies of relevant performance appraisals. Their judgements have indicated
employee termination decisions should be based on performance appraisals even if the
termination takes place within the probationary period. As a response, managers have
started appraising employee performance well before any termination is made:
Appraisal is done to justify that the promotion is being given to the right person
or, in the case of termination, to justify management’s position in the Tribunal
(NME03, Resort C).
Similarly, HR actors establish formal disciplinary and grievances procedures as a useful
defence in case employees appeal against dismissal at the Tribunal. This exemplifies how
HR actors use certain HR practices to legitimise their decisions. They are now savvy
enough about the legislation to know how to avoid it and not get caught. Although
employees can seek redress through litigation, in general employers have the advantage
because they have considerable resources at their disposal. For employees, resorting to
litigation is a high risk strategy that tends to undermine their future employment prospects.
HR actors also interpreted provisions of the law on working hours and break times from a
managerial perspective. For example, the law requires employees to have a break of at least
30 minutes after working five consecutive hours. Employers are also required to give meal
and prayer breaks. However, the law does not specify whether these breaks should be
included or excluded when calculating working hours. Resort E exploits this provision by
placing several breaks in between work schedules so that employees work extended hours
without an overtime allowance.
Concerning interpretation of the legislation, HR actors often sought clarification from
professional and social network sources such as managers in other resorts. As a HR
Director who worked in an international hotel chain resort explained:
Yesterday the parliament amended the clause on the employment law regarding
Ramadan bonus. So the question is, do we have to pay it for all hosts or just all
Muslim hosts? So part of my responsibility in area resorts is to create some
consistency between them. We ask around a kind of HR community and we
email each other, do you pay it before Ramadan? Or do you pay after? Who’re
you including and who’re you excluding? (HRM39, Resort A)
This typifies how HR actors sought legitimacy from their colleagues. By engaging with
their networks, this HR manager not only ensured her decisions were consistent with those
of other resorts belonging to the same parent company and with the majority of resorts in
the organisational field, but could justify her actions to corporate headquarters.
Overall, the tactics presented in this section reflect the shareholder dominant paradigm that
privileges short term shareholder value over longer term sustainability and stakeholder
wellbeing.

Negotiating and reconciling with stakeholders
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Faced with institutional pressure, HR managers often have to negotiate with two dominant
categories of stakeholders: government or regulatory bodies and employees. Managers
predominantly negotiate with employees in relation to the legislation on service charge
benefit, overtime allowances and working hours. Service charge benefit is a variable
component of resort workers’ pay. It was introduced to the tourism industry in the
Maldives by international hotel chains, and was soon adopted by local resorts. The amount
and timing of service charge payments remained within the discretion of resort
managements until the employment law came effect in 2008. The provision in the
employment law concerning service charge requires at least 99% of the monthly service
charge revenue to be distributed equally among all employees. Similarly, the Act requires
all employees to receive a day off after six consecutive days of work, and they are not
required to work more than 48 hours per week. If employees are made to work more than
48 hours per week, they are entitled to receive overtime allowances for the additional
hours.
More than half of the resorts in the study (C, D, E and F) provided employees with a fixed
amount as service charge in order to save on the amount resorts spend on employee service
charge. For example, Resort A did not change its policy on employee working hours for
some categories of employees (e.g. employees working in guest relations) after the law
came into effect. They stated that employees would be at the losing end if management
followed the new working hour requirements because changing the work schedule to
comply with the law would cost them a fortune. Resort C also provided a fixed amount as
overtime allowance for hours exceeding the 48 hours per week threshold. It did not
regularly pay overtime or service charge to employees but tried other strategies to justify
non-compliance. As a non-managerial employee pointed out:
It has been some time now since they stopped giving us overtime but they have
increased our salary. But it was a very small increase. We were told that we
would be better off with this arrangement. But we knew it was a trap (NME04,
Resort C).
‘Employees will be better off with our decision’ is a common argument made by the
managers negotiating with employees about employment law issues. This also exemplifies
how management uses moral arguments to justify their actions despite their behaviour
being driven by the business case. This tactic is particularly common when the parent
company is in financial hardship, leading to employee cynicism about managers’
justifications. For instance, employees in Resorts C and E were very unhappy about being
paid a fixed service charge. In Resort E, one reason why employees went on strike in 2009
was management’s non-compliance with legislative provisions about distributing service
charges.
However, some categories of employees such as guest relations staff benefited financially
from existing practices that contravene the provisions in the law. As a non-managerial
employee explained:
Being a Mr. Friday means we are on duty 24/7, so we always have a guest to
serve. If we work only eight hours, we are not assigned a guest next day. It
would be a huge loss for us as our income depends on tips we receive from our
guests (NME44, Resort A).
For these employees, working extra hours without an overtime allowance is worthwhile, as
they depend on tips as a major source of income. These employees said very little about the
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positive aspects of the legislation as most of the existing employment practices were more
favourable to them than the minimum requirements of the law.
Some managers in resorts belonging to international hotel chains raised concerns that
compliance with the law on employment agreements and job descriptions might lead
resorts to deviate from their company-wide best practices. However, as the law sets out
only very basic requirements, it is highly unlikely the resorts’ practices would be
inconsistent with the company practices as a result of complying with the legislation.
Managers exaggerated the pressures on them to adopt parent company practices and the
likely sanctions from HQ if they did not. TEAM executives claimed that international hotel
chains acted as if they were superior to others, thereby influencing institutional
requirements:
No law applies to them [international hotel chains] and nobody monitors what
they do. They [international hotel chains] operate like small countries within
the Maldives (EAM15).
Although rare, managers in long established local resorts also engaged in this kind of
behaviour. For example, Resort B handed an employee handbook to every employee upon
recruitment which included resort policies and procedures. However these were not
consistent with employment legislation. Employees were instructed to strictly follow the
handbook and were given the impression that the handbook was more important than laws
and regulations.
Both local and international hotel chains also used macro-environment changes, which
might affect the tourism industry, to seek government sympathy when they complained
about the difficulty of complying with the law. A government official explained how resort
managements used the Global Financial Crisis to try to avoid penalties for non-compliance:
Several resort managers tried to convince us that they found it difficult to
comply with the law due to the global financial crisis which is slowing the
tourism industry down. Their logic was simple: ‘it is better for staff to retain
their jobs rather than lose them because of the extra spending on our part to
comply with the law’ (GOO52).
HR actors in both local and international hotel chains used their personal relationships with
the authorities to bend the ‘rules of the game’. They also sometimes used practices that
verged on corruption to bargain with the government. As a non-managerial employee of an
international resort explained:
Last time we were on strike, the management told us that even if we stayed on
strike for six months, nothing would happen as long as this government was in
power. Even if a new government came in, the resort would be strong enough
to continue what they were doing and nothing would happen to them because
the resort had given money to the government’s [election] campaign (NME25,
Resort E).
Both local and international resorts had the capacity to bargain with the government
because resorts bring foreign currency to the economy. Weak labour inspection and law
enforcement mechanisms combined with a widely held perception that the government
lacked commitment to the legislation, encouraged HR actors to bargain about the need to
comply. Such tactics are encouraged by the government’s readiness to water down
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employment legislation to support employer interests, allowing business arguments to
justify what would otherwise be breaches of the law. The findings presented here suggest
that resorts which violated the law sometimes not only went unpunished but actually
enjoyed special privileges through their social and political connections.
Besides bargaining with the government on an individual basis, resorts also used
‘collective responses’ to influence the legislative agenda. These responses were channelled
through the employer association, Maldives Association of Tourism Industry (MATI), of
which all resorts in the study were members. MATI lobbied the government during the
drafting stage of the legislation to accommodate its concerns and proposed hundreds of
amendments after it came into effect. Owners or directors represented resorts in MATI and
MATI’s board was dominated by local resort owners. Local resorts thus played a more
pivotal role than international hotel chains in formulating a collective response to
government policies, laws and regulations. Overall, these strategies indicate that resort
managements were not only rule-takers but also rule-makers in respect of employment
legislation.

Achieving legitimacy through establishing and maintaining reputation
Some resort managements appeared to accede to the legislation in order to build and
maintain their reputation. For example, Resort A, which had a reputation for treating its
employees well, was very particular about its image and how its HRM practices were
perceived by external stakeholders. As the HR Director stated:
As a company, we certainly would not want to be exposed as not following the
law. It gets us bad PR if we as a top resort are caught not paying the Ramadan
bonus. We’re quite law-abiding. You know we’re quite proud of our reputation
for looking after our hosts. (HRM39, Resort A)
This suggests that a lot of pressure to conform to the legislation stems from the need to
gain legitimacy and government’s power to impose sanctions. Several managers said they
would go back to practices they had used before the law was implemented if not for the
legal consequences that would likely follow. This suggests that resort managements do not
want to risk their reputation in the short-term and their business in the long-term by not
complying with the legislation because this would increase the risk of strikes and lawsuits.
Managers of Resort B, F and C were also very particular about the potential consequences
for their resorts’ reputations flowing from their decisions about employees:
When we cut employee salaries and put [distribution of] service charge on hold
during the 2008 economic crisis, we didn’t get defensive. We knew that being
defensive would escalate the problem and get wide media coverage which
would further damage the image of our resort and change the public perception
of our company (LNM06, Resort C).
Approximately 60% of the employees of Resort C were from two inhabited islands
belonging to the constituency represented in parliament by the owner of Resort C.
Management therefore took care to include these employees in decision-making.
However, when the resort was unable to please employees, or when it had to choose
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between achieving external legitimacy and making employees happy, management chose
to ‘look good’ to the external audience. They did this by ‘spinning’ the media or avoiding
it:
The resort is good at spinning the media. This month we got our pay on the 17th
[which was late] But did you hear any news about it? No media has reported it.
They always talk about the generosity of our chairman (NME05, Resort C).
However, maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders in the long term
appears to depend on establishing a good reputation with employees. For example, Resorts
C and E had suffered from a poor reputation in the Maldivian labour market for the
preceding few years due to relatively poor employment conditions and non-compliance
with the law. When the service charge issue was taken up by a Trip Advisor forum in 2010,
three resorts in this study (B, C and E) were included in a list of ‘bad employers’ who
‘stole’ from the service charge owed to their staff ii . This ‘naming and shaming’ gave
negative publicity as Trip Advisor is one of the primary sources of information potential
guests use when choosing a holiday destination. As a result, these resorts found it difficult
to attract and retain competent local employees. Most of the non-managerial employees we
interviewed from these resorts said they wanted to leave the resort for better opportunities
elsewhere:
I am here because it is closer to Male’ [the capital of the Maldives] and I find it
easy to travel to Male’ to attend job interviews. To stay in Male’ is expensive
and I can’t afford to be without a job for long (NME25, Resort E).
There have been several circumstances where pressure from employees made resort
managements comply with the labour law. If resort managements did not comply with the
law or failed to provide reasonable services to employees, employees generally made
choices: either to leave the resort or stay and fight for their rights, primarily by organising
employee strikes and petitions.
Several managers said they could not fully comply with the employment law for financial
reasons. Several quotes presented previously corroborate this, indicating that strategic
responses and HRM practices aim to reduce costs, which were always considered in HR
decision-making, even when this risked legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. Managerial
employees highlighted several legislative provisions that would increase resorts’
operational costs. They include: (1) treatment of Friday as a public holiday; (2) overtime
rates, especially for Friday and other public holidays; (3) working hour requirements; and
granting an extra day in place of every public holiday falling during a period of leave.
[INSERT Table 4 HERE]

Discussion and conclusions
This study investigated, on the one hand, how employment legislation shaped HRM
practices in resorts in the Maldives and, on the other, how HR actors in resorts crafted
strategic choices to respond to the legislation. The study not only highlighted what HR
actors and stakeholders do, but also why and under what conditions particular kinds of
strategic responses emerge. Consistent with Najeeb (2014), the design, content and
implementation challenges of the legislation provided high latitude for HR actors to craft
14

their responses to the legislation in a strategically, resulting in the large range of responses
presented in Table 4. These responses are largely consistent with Oliver’s (1991)
categorisation as explained in the literature review. The analysis shows that HR actors
applied a range of compliance tactics which were essentially window dressing: ‘rational
myths’ that legitimated the organisation (Myer and Rowan, 1997). This lip service paid to
implementing the legislation reflects Oliver’s (1991) ‘ritual conformity’ or ‘avoidance’
strategy. In addition, lack of enforcement effectiveness resulted in the legislation having
little constraining impact on most resorts.
Resistance to full implementation of the legislation demonstrates HR actors’ ability to
mobilise and deploy power resources (Ferner et al., 2012; Edward et al., 2013). The results
of this study demonstrate a high level of interplay between HR actors and the institutional
environment (the government) as well as between HR actors and employees in relation to
institutional requirements. Because HR actors had room to manoeuvre, gambits of
resistance and negotiation took place. HR actors derived bargaining resources from various
sources to negotiate with stakeholders (predominantly employees and the government),
including their dominant position in the economy (Gunningle et al., 2015); changes in the
macro-environment (Parry and Tyson, 2009); their internal and external professional
networks (Ferner et al., 2012); and, in the case of international hotel chains, their relational
context (Edward et al., 2013; Tempel et al., 2006). Bargaining also took place in informal
ways (Karuhunen, 2008), including kickbacks to government officials and pampering
labour inspectors. This reflects the ‘control’ dimension of Oliver’s (1991) typology. HR
actors also lobbied the government in an effort to influence the content of the legislation,
channelling their concerns and proposals through MATI. This reflects Scott’s (2008)
collective responses to institutional pressure, Oliver’s (1991) ‘influence’ tactic, and Boon
et al.’s (2009) and Paauwe’s (2004) ‘active development’ construct. HR actors also
negotiated with employees and tried to justify managerial action to employees when the
organisation did not fully comply with legislation. This was because dissatisfied resort
workers often made choices – either to leave the resort or organise strikes and petitions.
One of the most common managerial arguments in favour of non-compliance was that
managers were acting in employees’ best interests (refer to Table 4). The role of HR actors
in resorts therefore involved reconciling government and employee pressures with the
needs of the organisation (Pulignano et al., 2013; Tyson, 1997).
Due to the complex nature of the legislation arising from design, content and
implementation gaps, HR actors were heavily engaged in making sense of the legislation
(Mayson and Barrett, 2017; Weick et al., 2005). They interpreted the legislation from
managerial, cost reduction and organisational performance perspectives (van Gestel and
Nyberg, 2009). However, their interpretations also revealed their interest in attaining
legitimacy in the eyes of both employees and external stakeholders. Managerial
interpretation of the legislation was primarily driven by business case and operational
perspectives. In a competitive environment, some resort managements acted consistently
with the traditional ‘cost control’ management style prevalent in the industry (Gunnigle et
al., 2015; Head and Lucas, 2004; Lucas, 2002). Accordingly, some HR actors pushed the
boundaries of the legislation in order to avoid complying with provisions they felt would
harm business efficiency (Pratten and Lovatt, 2005). This led to deliberate exploitation of
loopholes in the legislation and placed employees at the periphery of HR decision-making.
The finding is consistent with Heed and Lucas’s (2004, p.335) concept of ‘determined
managerial opportunism’, that is, managers’ deliberate attempts to exploit the law or
interpret it to their advantage. However, HR actors tried to show that they acted in
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accordance with the letter of the legislation, if not its spirit (Head and Lucas, 2004;
Harcourt et al., 2010).
The study shows that HR actors engaged in a political process with the government and
employees based on, in Birkinsaw and Fry’s (1998, p.52) terms, “proactive, pushy, and
sometimes Machiavellian tactics”. However, there was no evidence of HR actors
exercising full-blown defiance of the employment legislation. It was always circumvented
in subtle and covert ways. Most strategic responses comprised passive resistance such as
decoupling (conceal and buffer) rather than active resistance. There are three explanations
for this. First, organizations are often faced with conflicting demands to reduce cost and
attain legitimacy and Oliver (1991) suggests that decoupling is the likely response in such
situations. Second, most organisations implement practices similar to the requirements of
the employment legislation well before it comes into force, especially when it accords with
their existing practices. Resistance to regulatory demands is strongest when organisations
perceive the imposed rules as alien or harmful to them (Ferner et al., 2012; Edward et al.,
2013). Third, resort managements cannot overtly defy government requirements because
they need to continue to be part of the Maldivian tourism industry.
The study shows that strategic responses were driven by the quest for legitimacy, for
efficiency, or sometimes both. HR actors seemed to be seeking legitimacy in the eyes of
both employees (key internal stakeholders) and external stakeholders. However, when
forced to choose, HR actors preferred ‘looking good’ to ‘acting good’ (Kennedy and Fiss,
2009). Although resort managements want to be viewed as fair employers, consideration of
costs and political influence led them to risk legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. HR
actors were happy to comply with provisions that aligned with their best practices, lending
support to Goodstein’s (1994) and Oliver’s (1991) hypothesis that organisations are more
inclined to conform to institutional pressures when they perceive that conformity is
consistent with their organisational goals. Moreover, while HR actors tried to comply with
the legislation for the sake of legitimacy, they also used the legislation to legitimise some
HR decisions such as terminations or promotion. Our findings thus support the argument
that the institutional environment can be both a constraining and an enabling force (Barley
and Tolbert, 1997).
The study highlights the effect of employment legislation on some HR practices including,
as Table 4 illustrates, recruitment, compensation and benefits, flexible work practices,
employment contracts and job descriptions, performance appraisals, and disciplinary and
grievance procedures. These practices are enacted or reshaped as a response or as a result
of responses to the legislation.
As Table 4 illustrates, there was not much difference between resorts in terms of their
strategic responses to the legislation and the HRM practices they adopted. The findings
thus support the basic assumption of institutional theory that organisations in a similar
environment will respond to institutional pressures similarly and adopt similar HRM
practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). One plausible explanation for this similarity could
be the use of HR actors’ social and professional networks when responding to the
legislation. Investigation of other mimetic and normative mechanisms may provide further
explanations. However, the study also highlights that international hotel chains serving
high-end markets (market orientation) and which have progressive HRM practices were
more inclined to comply with legislation than other resorts.
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Implications, limitations and directions for future research
The study has four practical implications. First, for policy makers, it demonstrates the ways
managers can make choices within the constraints of employment legislation. Although the
law imposes certain constraints on managers, they seek to exploit the loopholes in the
legislation and circumvent the law as they see fit (Heed and Lucas, 2004). Policy makers
need to address the gaps in the legislation (Najeeb, 2014), and achieve more simplicity and
clarity in the law if they wish to achieve their reform objectives. Clearer, more explicit
employment rights may encourage longer term cooperation and continuity in the
workplace, even if this is at the expense of managerial power (Harcourt et al., 2010).
Similar to the case of anti-discrimination legislation in New Zealand (Harcourt el al.,
2010), our study points to widespread non-compliance with the law. This highlights the
difficulty of securing employee rights through individually orientated employment
legislation if monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are weak (Harcourt et al., 2010).
The noncompliance we found in this study reveals the limitations of legislation in countries
with a ‘broad brush’ approach to legislation.
Second, the findings highlighted that HR actors preferred ‘appearing to be good’ in the
eyes of external stakeholders to pleasing their employees. Given the tight local labour
market conditions (Najeeb, 2013) and the high incidence of employee turnover and protest
action in resorts, managers need to understand that achieving legitimacy in the eyes of
employees and external legitimacy (in the eyes of other stakeholders) is not an either-or
choice, but should be seen as simultaneous goals (Collings and Dick, 2011).
Third, the study showed decoupling to be the resorts’ dominant strategic response to
legislation. Decoupling is often referred to as organisational hypocrisy (Krasner, 1991) and
it can lead to cynicism among employees and external stakeholders. Employees were
aware of managers’ decoupling behaviour. All this suggests that continuing with excessive
decoupling or cynical behaviour could bring pathological consequences such as employee
distrust towards management (Han and Koo, 2010).
Fourth, the findings showed that different categories of resort workers felt differently about
the impact of the legislation. For instance, core workers (employees working in guest
relations) in some resorts saw few positives in the legislation as they currently enjoyed
better benefits than their non-core colleagues. Pressure to comply with the legislation came
primarily from non-core workers. Lengnick-Hall et al. (2009, p.76) suggest that it is
important “to consider both political aspects of HRM implementation and the perception of
HR priorities and expertise by different groups within the organisation”. Therefore, when
designing and implementing HRM practices in response to employment legislation, HR
actors need to take the views of both worker cohorts into account.
A limitation of this study was its focus on one industrial sector and to a particular piece of
legislation. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between
institutional context and HRM. Future research could focus on other institutional
environments and industries to explore different configurations of relationships between
macro (institutional) and micro (organisational) factors. To gain a clearer picture of the
impact of institutional context on organisational HRM practices in a given field, future
research could also consider DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) three institutional
mechanisms: coercive, normative and mimetic. While legislation is viewed as a key
institutional force in this study, other contextual aspects such as local cultural norms,
stakeholder pressure, existing relationships, reputational concerns, possible risks that arise
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from certain choices are only minimally highlighted. Future research could analyse in more
depth how these factors affect strategic choices. This study suggests that the enactment of
HR practices via interactions between the institutional environment and HR actors is an
ongoing process rather than a one-off event (Edward et al., 2013; Tempel et al., 2006).
Future research could use a longitudinal approach and concepts such as sensemaking and
embeddedness to explore HRM changes over time.
Overall, this study shows that responding to employment legislation entails a high level of
interplay between the institutional environment and HR actors, and between stakeholders
(e.g. employees) and HR actors. It demonstrates the difficulty of reconciling institutional
requirements with the preferences of different stakeholders and organisational interests
(Gunningle et al., 2015; Rupidara and McGraw, 2011). HR actors actively make sense of
institutional requirements and modify HRM practices to accommodate stakeholders’
varying perspectives and preferences. This suggests that in countries such as the Maldives,
uneven institutional coverage (e.g. incomplete employment legislation) allows room for
organisations to innovate – for better or worse.
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Chapter 4 of the legislation consists of employment agreement, working hours, work ethics, dismissal,
leave entitlement and remuneration clauses as well as provision on seeking legal redress for employment
matters.
The link to the discussion on the trip advisor is http://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/ShowTopic-g293953i7445-k3462287-10_Service_charge_update-Maldives.html
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